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Short Abstract: Scattered residential development is explained using a theoretical 
model of residential location in which household interactions generate externalities that 
determine location choices.  Results demonstrate the role of income and heterogeneous 
preferences in generating this form of sprawl.  Among our findings is that rising income 
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Introduction 
Urban sprawl is a catch-all phrase that is often used to refer to various aspects of changing urban 
form characterized by low density, scattered, or mixed use development.  Within economics, 
sprawl has been largely conceived of and analyzed as two complementary urban land use 
patterns: decentralization of cities and leapfrog (or scattered) development.
1  Rising household 
incomes, along with population growth and declining transportation costs, have been 
hypothesized to be a primary driving force of decentralization (Mieszkowski and Mills).  With 
increasing incomes, households are hypothesized to consume more housing services, which 
leads to an expansion of the overall city size (Brueckner).  In addition, to the extent that 
households substitute land consumption for proximity to the city, rising incomes will redistribute 
population towards the suburbs and away from the central city.  Finally, because suburbs are 
often perceived as having superior public goods and services, increases in income are 
hypothesized to spur households to engage in Tieboutian moves to suburban locations in search 
of these superior goods and services (O’Sullivan).  Empirical evidence supports these theoretical 
hypotheses.  For example, Brueckner and Fansler find that sprawl, as proxied by city size, is 
positively influenced by average household income levels.  Based on empirical results from a 
model of household location, Margo estimates that about 40% of the increase in suburbanization 
between 1950 and 1980 is attributable to increases in household income. 
 
While evidence supports a broad connection between rising incomes and sprawl in terms of 
population decentralization, theoretical motivations and empirical evidence regarding the role of 
income in generating sprawl at a finer spatial scale, e.g., in the form of scattered or leapfrog 
development, are much more limited.  The standard income effect that links rising incomes to 
increased consumption of housing and land, both normal goods, implies that increases in income 
will lead to a more dispersed or scattered pattern of development.  Other than this hypothesis, 
which is implicit in Brueckner’s discussion of sprawl and city size, the closest explanation linking 
                                                
1  Both trends capture relevant aspects of sprawl, but at different spatial scales.  Decentralization (or 
suburbanization) is typically used to refer to metropolitan-wide shifts in population away from central cities 
towards suburban locations whereas leapfrog (or scattered) development typically refers to a finer scale 
pattern of development that is characterized by intervening plots of vacant land.    2
income and leapfrogging is from Mills.  He extends the basic intertemporal efficiency model of 
leapfrog development (e.g., Ohls and Pines) by incorporating economic growth into a two-period 
model of land development.  He shows how uncertainty over future returns and heterogeneity 
among land developers’ expectations can lead to permanent scattered and mixed use patterns of 
development.  More recent explanations of leapfrogging focus on the role externalities, e.g., 
externalities from public parks that attract residents (Wu and Plantinga) and, for the case of 
scattered development, externalities from neighboring land uses (Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; 
Parker and Metersky, Turner).    
 
To explore the role of income in generating sprawl at a finer spatial scale, we develop a 
theoretical model of scattered residential development,
2 in which spatial interactions among 
households generate a set of locational features that are hypothesized to be the primary 
determinants of household location.  For example, spatial clustering of households can generate 
both local benefits, e.g., the provision of public infrastructure and the availability of neighborhood 
networks, as well as costs, e.g., neighborhood congestion and the loss of open space amenities.  
Thus, rather than defining space exogenously in terms of distance to an exogenously located 
central city, space is defined endogenously by the relative proximity of households to each other 
and the spatial externalities that result are treated as the primary determinant of a household’s 
location choice.  This approach is consistent with some of the more recent models of scattered 
development (Parker and Metersky, Turner), in which endogenous land use externalities from 
neighboring plots of land influence household choice, and is similar in spirit to the approach taken 
by some theoretical models of suburban subcenter formation (e.g., Fujita and Ogawa).  In 
addition, it is consistent with the empirical evidence on spatial externalities and residential 
patterns, which indicates that such local externalities are a significant determinant of these 
patterns (Carrion-Flores and Irwin, Irwin and Bockstael, 2002, 2004).  This approach is in contrast 
                                                
2 By scattered development we mean low-density, dispersed development with intervening vacant land that 
is typical of urban-rural fringe landscapes in the U.S. and refer interchangeably to this as scattered 
development, leapfrog development, or sprawl. While some researchers associate leapfrog development 
explicitly with an urban distance gradient, we treat is as a more generic land use pattern that is not 
necessarily defined with respect to the city center.  3
to the majority of theoretical models of leapfrog development, which have been developed within 
the framework of the monocentric model and explain leapfrogging as the result of distance to the 
city center, as well as heterogeneous expectations among landowners (Mills, 1981) or publicly 
provided open space (Wu and Plantinga).   
 
In developing such a model, we depart from the traditional monocentric framework and define 
space as the average distance between a household and neighboring households.  Thus, this 
approach is applicable for describing residential patterns for cases in which distance to a central 
location is not a primary factor.
3  Both positive and negative spatial externalities are assumed to 
decay continuously with average distance to a maximum point, at which point they disappear.  
Positive externalities generate benefits to nearby households and encourage agglomeration, e.g., 
people may find it beneficial to live close enough to others so as to reap social benefits from 
neighbors. In addition, there may be positive effects associated with a critical density of residents 
in an area that attracts public or private services. Negative externalities create disutility among 
neighboring households and encourage dispersion, e.g., due to congestion of local public goods, 
including environmental goods, lack of neighboring open space, pollution, or simply the desire of 
living in relative isolation from others. By incorporating these effects into a model of household 
location choice, we are able to describe the household’s bid curve as a function of the optimal 
average distance between a household and its neighbors.  From this we derive the household’s 
demand for distance and examine the effects of spatial externalities and household preferences 
and income on the regional pattern of scattered development.  Results show that increases in 
household income will increase the optimal distance among households, but that this effect 
diminishes with further increases in income and eventually goes to zero.  This is due to the fact 
that distance to other households is not always a normal good and thus income effects in a model 
of spatial externalities are not always positive.  The result is that continual increases in household 
                                                
3  For example, this approach is applicable for describing patterns within a smaller area, e.g., a 
neighborhood, for which all locations are relatively equi-distant from the employment center or for areas 
located relatively far from the urban center (e.g., exurban areas), such that differences in distance to the city 
are small across locations.  Alternatively, this model applies to cases in which transportation costs are 
sufficiently low or employment is more uniformly distributed throughout the region such that distance to a 
single employment center is not a primary factor.   4
income over time are predicted to generate only temporary increases in scattered residential 
development.  We also consider the influence of heterogeneous households, as distinguished by 
their preferences over the spatial externalities, on the effect of income on scattered development.  
Although the total amount of scattered development is clearly increasing in the proportion of 
households that have strong preferences for more isolated locations, we find that the rate of 
increase in scattered development due to rising household incomes is greater the higher the 
proportion of “average” households
4 in the region.   
 
Explaining Scattered Residential Development 
Theoretical models of leapfrog or scattered development have suggested different causes of 
leapfrogging, including efficient intertemporal decisionmaking, heterogeneous expectations 
among land developers under uncertainty, heterogeneous preferences among households, and 
spatial externalities.  The traditional explanation of leapfrogging is that it is a temporary process 
that results from intertemporal efficient decisionmaking by land developers.  For instance, Ohls 
and Pines develop a two period model in which households trade-off living space and 
accessibility and demonstrate that under certain conditions, discontinuous development will be 
efficient. They argue that if households prefer lower densities (or if lower costs are associated 
with lower densities), then lower density housing further from city center will be built initially to 
accommodate this desire for low density, while leaving the skipped-over land to be filled with 
higher-density residential buildings during later stages of development.  Fujita (1976) uses a 
dynamic version of the monocentric model to compare the efficiency of the competitive outcome, 
in which vacant land is skipped over for a period of time, with the optimal equilibrium growth path 
and finds that the competitive path with leapfrog development is efficient.  In a later work, Fujita 
(1983) differentiates households by income in which differences in incomes drive differences in 
buildings and activity types. He shows that, under conditions of perfect foresight, a “sprawl-
fashioned urbanization” process is more efficient.  The spatial growth of the city is characterized 
                                                
4 Average households are defined as those that have moderated preferences over the positive and negative 
externalities that are generated by proximity of a household to others.  5
by a pattern of leapfrog and mixed development, which is shown to be an intertemporal efficient 
process of land development.   
 
Mills develops an extension of these models by incorporating multiple types of development 
(residential and industrial) and alternative assumptions about economic growth relative to 
landowners’ expectations in a two-period analysis.  When landowners are uncertain about future 
returns, they must speculate in the first period because they cannot know for certain how much 
land to be withheld and preserved for future industrial expansion. A permanent pattern of leapfrog 
development results when actual growth is insufficient to fill the vacant land with industrial 
expansion. When extending his model to include heterogeneous expectations, Mills finds that 
either scattered development occurs if actual growth in the second period is less than 
landowners’ expectations or mixed development occurs if actual growth in the second period is 
greater than expected growth. 
 
Alternatively, Bar-Ilan and Strange explain leapfrogging as the result of uncertainty combined with 
temporal lags in development.  As described by Capozza and Helsley (1989), uncertainty over 
future returns to development introduces an option value to delaying development (i.e., a growth 
premium).  Findings from Capozza and Helsley’s (1990) model show that, although the presence 
of uncertainty and irreversibility delay development, they cannot cause leapfrogging. Bar-Ilan and 
Strange consider the role of development lags in this model.  They find that in a non-lag scenario, 
uncertainty increases with distance and thus so does the option value. Therefore, leapfrogging 
does not occur as landowners at the edge of a city will exhibit more caution than central owners 
and wait.  However, when development lags are incorporated into the model, leapfrog 
development can occur because lags reduce the option value and thus uncertainty is less a 
deterrent to development.   
 
Heterogeneity in agent preferences or incomes has been shown to generate leapfrog 
development.  Fujita (1982) develops a model to examine the spatial dynamics of residential  6
development and shows that, while leapfrog development does not occur when all households 
have homogeneous income levels, it is the general development pattern in the suburbs if there 
are multiple income classes and housing is a non-neutral good.  Page analyzes city formation 
using an agent location model where agents’ preferences depend on location’s population and its 
separation (its average distance from other agents).  Given their preferences on population at 
their own location and the average distance from their location to other agents, individual agent’s 
decision about where to locate result in different “macro” spatial configurations.   
 
Leapfrog or scattered pattern of residential development has also been explained as an outcome 
of public policies, e.g., zoning, public open space preservation, or publicly provided infrastructure, 
e.g., roads and sewer lines.  Turnbull examines the effect of zoning on the pace and pattern of 
residential development using a dynamic open city model. Zoning, which is specified as a 
minimum lot size restriction, is shown to temporarily halt development at some locations while 
inducing leapfrog development at others, both phenomena that in the absence of zoning would 
not occur.  Wu and Plantinga, investigate the impact of public open space on residential land use 
patterns in a city.  They use an open city monocentric model, but, in contrast to the traditional 
model, residential sites are differentiated by their proximity to open space, which generates 
distance-dependent amenities for residents.  After solving for the spatial market equilibrium, they 
use a series of simulations to examine the conditions under which public open space causes 
leapfrog development when placed outside the city by spurring development of nearby land 
before land closer to the city is developed.  
 
Finally, leapfrog development has been explained as the result of spatial externalities that arise 
from interactions among households that cause households to locate apart from each other.   
Turner develops a game theoretic model of residential location choice in which people choose to 
immigrate to a city and derive utility from their proximity to open space.  In a static framework, the 
equilibrium development outcome consists of three regions: An urban region near to the old city 
that is solidly occupied, a more extreme suburban region where only alternate spaces are  7
occupied, and an unoccupied frontier. Any immigrant at a suburban location who does not obtain 
open space benefits is strictly better off in an alternate city and therefore, no adjacent occupied 
spaces are possible in the suburbs.  When incorporating a dynamic component, Turner finds that 
an equilibrium location profile has the same basic form as the static games. In addition he show 
that if proximity to open space is sufficiently valuable and player are sufficiently patient, then at 
least some suburban locations must be occupied before all urban locations are occupied, 
generating leapfrog development.  In both the static and dynamic games, he finds that the 
competitive equilibrium is not efficient: it will contain too many people too close together because 
the external open space effects are not considered. In addition, in the dynamic game, the 
equilibrium development path deviates from the optimum because suburban locations are 
developed earlier than they should be and thus generate leapfrog development.  Parker and 
Meteresky develop an agent-based model of urban and agricultural land use in which transport 
costs pull urban uses to the center of the city, negative externalities between agricultural and 
urban users encourage separation and negative externalities between urban users encourage 
dispersal of urban activity.  They simulate this model and show that the negative externalities 
associated with urban land generate a fragmented pattern of development on the urban fringe, 
which surrounds a contiguous urban core. 
 
The vast majority of the papers reviewed above explain leapfrog development within the 
framework of the monocentric model, which assumes that proximity to the city center is a primary 
determinant of urban land use patterns.  Leapfrog development is explained either as the result of 
dynamic efficiency decisions, made under conditions of either perfect foresight or uncertainty, that 
are driven by the urban land rent gradient or as the result of additional sources of exogenous 
heterogeneity.  A limitation of this approach is that it fails to consider how leapfrog development 
may arise endogenously from a process of interdependent household decisionmaking about 
location or land use.  In contrast are the models by Turner and Parker and Meteresky, in which 
leapfrogging is posited as the result of spatial externalities generated by other households’ 
location or land use decisions.  However, both these papers focus only on externalities that  8
create repelling effects that cause development to disperse.  Positive externalities that cause 
residential land to cluster are of course also quite plausible.  Such household interaction effects 
have been incorporated into previous urban economic models that have explained urban spatial 
structure as the result of social interactions (e.g., Beckman, Page) and there is some empirical 
evidence of both positive and negative effects associated with neighboring residential 
development (e.g., Carrion-Flores and Irwin, Irwin and Bockstael, 2002, 2004).  Thus a more 
general model would consider the role of both agglomerative and repelling effects that are 
generated from proximity of households to each other and how the tension between these effects 
influences leapfrog or scattered development.    
 
A Model of Household Location with Spatial Externalities 
We begin with a model in which households are assumed to maximize utility by choosing 
residential location and the amount of a composite good.  To focus on the role of endogenous 
interactions among households, we assume that residential location is defined solely in terms of 
the location of households relative to one another.  Proximity of households to one another 
generate externalities that yield both positive (agglomerative) and negative (repelling) spatial 
externalities.  Households have preferences over these effects and thus, in choosing a location, 
households choose the optimal levels of positive and negative externalities generated by the 
relative proximity of neighboring households.  To simplify a measure of neighboring household 
proximity, we assume that all nearest neighbors (i.e., houses on lots that share a common 
border) are equi-distant, so that the distance between a house and its nearest neighbor is the 
same for all nearest neighbors and thus is equal to the average distance the nearest neighbors.
5  
To capture the effects of heterogeneous households, we allow for different types of households 
who vary in their preferences over the agglomerative and repelling effects.  As a result, a 
household’s optimal distance to neighbors will characterize and distinguish each type of 
household; some households enjoy living in neighborhoods that are within close proximity to 
                                                
5  Because we assume a lattice structure, this distance measure corresponds exactly to a measure of 
residential density around each house and thus we refer interchangeably to average distance and 
neighborhood density.   9
others (i.e., higher density neighborhoods) while others prefer to live in much more isolated 
places (i.e., lower density neighborhoods).   A representative household of type j will maximize 
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where  X is a composite good, G is a scalar that represents the net positive externalities 
(agglomerative effects) from neighboring households and R is a scalar that captures the net 
negative externalities (repelling effects) from neighbors.  In this version of the model we suppress 
the household’s choice of the amount of housing services that it consumes and assume that the 
quality of housing services, as determined by the relative proximity of the house to neighboring 
houses, is the only characteristic that distinguishes houses.
6   
We assume that the physical decay over distance (d) of both effects is the same and that this 
relationship is linear:  
01 GR d γγ ==−          ( 2 )  
Equation (2) says that both effects (G and R) decrease with distance at the same rate, 1 γ , and 





, the effects of positive and 
negative externalities go to zero.  Substituting equation (2) into (1) yields: 
() () ()
2 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
θ β α θ γ γ β γ γ α
j j
j j j j j j d d X U − − − = .      ( 1 ’ )  
Equation (1’) shows a Cobb-Douglas utility function where parameters θ 1 and θ 2 reflect the weight 
households give to the composite good and to the net effect of distance on their utility 
( 1 , 0 2 1 ≤ ≤ θ θ ).  Agglomeration effects are assumed to generate diminishing marginal returns 
and thus utility is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate in agglomerative effects.  Conversely, 
we treat repelling effects like congestion effects, which are very low or non-existent for low levels 
of the congestible good and typically increase at an increasing rate for higher levels of the good.  
                                                
6 Including the amount of housing services would allow us to take account of how households trade-off 
quantity of house with proximity to others, but the basic results with respect to how spatial externalities 
influence household decision-making hold irrespective of this trade-off.    10
Thus repelling effects are assumed to generate disutility at an increasing rate.  These 
assumptions imply that  1 0 1 ≤ ≤ α  and 1 1 ≥ β . Household types are distinguished by their 
preferences over agglomerative and repelling effects and thus by the specific values assigned to 
α 0 and β 0, both of which are assumed to be non-negative.  These assumptions guarantee the 
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Taken together with the linear distance-decay process specified in (2), these assumptions imply 
that utility is affected non-linearly by distance due to the trade-off that households make between 
agglomerative and repelling forces when choosing their optimal distance.    
 
Households are assumed to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint: 
) ( * d r pX I j j + = ,          ( 3 )  
where I is income, r*(d) is the market price of a house at distance d, and p is the price of the 
composite good. Housing price r*(d) it is determined in the market by both the distributions of 
consumer tastes and producer costs and thus is exogenous to individual households. Because it 
is a function of housing characteristics (in this case, average distance to neighboring houses), we 
treat r*(d) as a hedonic price function from which the implicit price for distance can be derived 
(Rosen).
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7 The hedonic price function is a double envelope of households bid curves and developers offer curves and 
therefore it depends on the determinants of demand and supply. For all firms and households to be in 
equilibrium, all bid and offer curves for distance, for each participant in the market, must be tangent to the 
hedonic price function.  For more details, see Rosen or Freeman.  11





* = ϕ is the marginal implicit price for distance.  
Equations (4) and (5) indicate that at the optimum households will equate the marginal utilities 
and marginal costs of the composite good and distance respectively.  Interpreted jointly they say 
that at the optimum, the marginal utility of the last dollar spent in the composite good should be 
equal to the marginal utility from the last dollar spent in distance: 
() ()
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Considering the household’s optimal choice of distance, d*, it is clear that the household will 
never choose values of d for which the net spatial externality effect is negative.  This is because 





, at which point the spatial externality effect 
is zero.  Thus for any d*, it will always be the case that  0
1 1
0 0 ≥ −
β α β α R G .  Given this, the 
household’s choice of d is influenced by the trade-off between the marginal disutility of distance 
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The household derives disutility from a marginal increase in distance due to the loss of 
agglomeration benefits that an increase in distance implies (5’), but derives utility from the decline 
in congestion externalities that accompanies an increase in distance (5’’). The trade-off between 
these two effects determines the optimal distance among neighbors, which varies across types of 
households. 
 
Household Demand for Distance 
From (4) and (5) we can obtain the household’s (uncompensated) bid rent function for distance, 
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The household’s bid rent function reflects the household’s willingness to pay for a house at every 
distance, while the hedonic price function, r*(d), is the minimum price that households must pay in 
the market. Thus household utility is maximized at the point at which the household’s bid equals 
the market price:  ( ) ( )
* * * , , j j uj j j I d r d r ϕ = , where  d* is the optimal distance. At this optimal 
point, the bid curves have the same slope and are tangent to the hedonic price function and thus 
the marginal bid and the marginal implicit price of distance are equal: 
uj j ϕ ϕ =
* .           ( 8 )  
Combining (7) and the equality from (8) that holds in equilibrium allows us to derive an expression 

























.     (9) 
Equation (9) is the household’s marginal willingness to pay for distance, which is the household’s 
uncompensated inverse demand for distance. It depends positively on the rate of decay of 
externalities with distance, 1 γ , the relative preference weighting of externalities in the utility 
function,  1 2 θ θ , and negative externalities (R) and negatively on positive externalities from 
neighbors (G).  Simulations of (9) for specific parameter values, described in more detail in the 
following section, reveal that the demand for distance is positive and decreasing over ranges of d 
over which utility is increasing and negative for ranges of d over which utility is decreasing (see 
figure 3).   
 
Income and Scattered Development 
In order to examine how household location choices influence scattered development, we focus 
on how the household’s choice of optimal distance changes with changes in income and with  13
heterogeneity in households’ preferences over the agglomerative and repelling effects generated 
by proximity to neighbors.  As a household’s choice of optimal distance from its neighbors 
increases, so does the degree of scattered or leapfrog development in the region and thus factors 
that increase optimal distance will increase this form of sprawl.  Given this, we are interested in 
testing whether this form of sprawl is increasing in income, as is suggested by previous models, 
and whether increases in income affect heterogeneous households differentially in terms of their 
optimal location decision.  The latter allows us to investigate the interaction between 
heterogeneous preferences and income and whether the income effect associated with 
households that have stronger preferences for more isolated locations contributes more to sprawl 
than the income effect associated with those with weaker preferences for isolated locations.  
 
The effect of income changes on optimal distance 
Comparative statics is used to examine the effect of an exogenous change in income on the 
household’s equilibrium bid function (equation 7), where the marginal implicit price of distance, 
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depends on the sign of ϕ uj. From 
equation (9) we know that the sign of ϕ uj changes with distance such that, for  j j j d d d ˆ
0 < < , ϕ uj 
                                                
8 Remember that  d R G 1 0 γ γ − = = .  14
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− = , which is the 
distance at which household j maximizes its utility.  Thus, for  j j j d d d ˆ
0 < < , utility is positive and 
increasing over dj and distance behaves as a normal good.  On the other hand, for 










= j d  is the distance at which agglomerative 
and repelling effects vanish.  In this case, utility is positive and decreasing over dj and distance 
behaves as an inferior good.  
 
As discussed earlier, the market equilibrium is defined by a set of tangencies between the 
households’ bid functions and the offer curves of the sellers (in this case assumed to be housing 
developers).  Although we refrain from developing an explicit model of the supply side, we 
assume that developers can achieve economics of scale in housing production when houses are 
within sufficient proximity of each other and thus, that developers’ offer curves are non-
decreasing over distance.  On the other hand, as discussed above, household bid functions are 
increasing over distance only for distances that are less than or equal to their unconstrained 
optimal distance,  j d
K
, and are decreasing with distances that are greater than this.  Given these 
conditions, a market equilibrium implies that households will be located at distances that are less 
than or equal to  j d
K
 since an offer curve can only be tangent to that portion of the bid curve that 
correspond to this distance range.  In this case, increases in income will cause a household to 
increase its optimal distance from neighbors so long as households are not already located at 
their unconstrained optimum (i.e., so long as  j
*
j d ˆ d < ).  However, once a household reaches 
j d ˆ , further increases in income will have no effect on distance decisions and additional income  15
will be allocated to the consumption of other goods, ceteris paribus.  These results lead us to 
conclude that, keeping population constant, scattered development that is driven by spatial 
externalities is a process that is driven only temporarily by increases in income. This process is 
the result of households looking, over time, for a location that satisfies their preferences over 
proximity to others. Once households have reached their unconstrained optimum,  j d ˆ , increases 
in income will not be reflected in greater distances, ceteris paribus, because distance becomes 
an inferior good over the range  j j j d d d 1 ˆ < < .  If we accept that income increases over time, we 
can assert that distance among households reaches a static equilibrium point and that increases 
in income only generate temporary increases in scattered development due to spatial 
externalities, other things equal. 
 
Income effects with heterogeneous households 
While the comparative statics tell us something about how the household’s optimal distance 
changes with income, we cannot readily compare the magnitude of this change across different 
household types (as differentiated by their preferences over proximity to neighbors).  To obtain 
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where Zj is defined as in equation (10). The sign of income elasticity depends of the sign of ϕ uj. 
Household j’s income elasticity is positive for  j dd <
K
 and negative for  j dd >
K
, where  j d
K
 is the 
optimal distance to neighbors for household type j. The magnitude of the percentage change in 
distance due to a change in income varies among households and depends, among other things, 
on the values of the parameters governing preferences over proximity to neighbors.   
 
To further examine how heterogeneous preferences influence the income elasticity of demand for 
distance, a simulation is performed for three types of households that have identical incomes, but  16
heterogeneous preferences over their proximity to neighbors.  We refer to these three types as 
gregarious, average, and loner households.  Gregarious households value the benefits from living 
within close proximity to their neighbors, but also perceive some of the negative effects from 
congestion. Average households perceive a relatively balanced mix of benefits and costs 
associated with proximity to neighbors and thus do not like locating too close or too far from 
others. Loner households primarily perceive the costs from congestion generated by neighbors 
and only a few of the potential benefits from proximity and thus try to locate relatively far from 
neighbors.  To define each type of household, variations in the values of some parameters are 




Figures 1 to 4 report the results of the simulation, including the optimal distance, compensated 
bid function,
10 uncompensated marginal willingness to pay for distance, and income elasticity of 
demand for distance for each type of household.  We use these results to discuss the optimal 
choices of each household type and the implications of this heterogeneity for scattered residential 
development.  Gregarious households have a positive utility over the relevant distance range 
(from zero to γ 0/γ 1), but their utility is increasing only for a portion of this range, 0 g dd <<
K
 (figure 
1). Their maximum willingness to pay for a house is at  0 g dd =>
K
 (figure 2) and their demand 
for distance is positive only for the range  g g d ˆ d < ≤ 0  (figure 3).   On the other hand, the range 
of distances for which average households’ utility is increasing is much greater than the 
gregarious households (figure 1) and therefore, its marginal willingness to pay for distance is 
positive for a greater range of d (figure 3).  Lastly, loner households maximize utility at  l dd =

, 
which is very close to the distance at which agglomerative and repelling effects vanishes, γ 0/γ 1. 
                                                
9  Specifically, we vary the following parameters as follows for the gregarious, average, and loner 
households:  α 0   =  14, 20, and 40 respectively and β 0  =  0.75, 2, and 20 respectively.  The following 
parameters are held constant at the following values: θ 1 = 0.5; θ 2 = 1; α 1 = 0.5; β 1 = 1.5; γ 0 = 10; and γ 1 = 1. 
10 We graph the compensated bid function since the uncompensated function in (9) is a function of the 
marginal implicit price of distance, ϕ *, which is an endogenous variable.  The compensated bid function is 
derived by substituting (3) into (1’), holding utility constant and solving for r(d) as a function of distance.  17
This type of household faces a small distance range for which their utility is positive and small 
range for which it is increasing (figure 1). Its willingness to pay for a house within its relevant 
distance range is the steepest of all types of households (figure 2) and these households have 
the highest demand for housing that is located at further distances (figure 3). 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the differences in the income elasticity of demand for distance across 
household types.  In each case, households’ demand for distance is more or less income elastic 
depending on distance.  Households’ income elasticity of demand for distance is zero at the 
household’s unconstrained optimum and is the most inelastic and positive (negative) for 
distances that are just less than (greater than) this value.  Thus, at the unconstrained optimum, 
income changes do not alter the household’s optimal choice of distance.  For all households, the 
income elasticity goes to zero at distances that are at or beyond the maximum distance for which 
externalities are generated (d = γ 0/γ 1).   
 
Households’ income elasticity varies in sign and magnitude by household type.  Gregarious and 
average households exhibit an income elasticity of demand for distance that is positive and highly 
elastic for distances that are substantially less than their respective unconstrained optimal 
distances.  Distances that are farther than this point reduce utility and therefore the income 
elasticity is negative for these distances.  The gregarious households’ demand for distance is 
highly income elastic for shorter distances, but their income elasticity is positive only for a 
relatively narrow range of distances before reaching their unconstrained optimum.  On the other 
hand, the income elasticity for average households is less elastic, but is positive for a greater 
range of distances.  Finally, loner households are the most inelastic of all types as the range of 
distances for which their utility (as well as their demand for distance) is positive and increasing is 
very short and close to the distance at which the externalities vanish.  
 
Taken together, these results indicate that the effect of income on household location will depend 
on both the household’s initial location and their particular set of preferences over the spatial  18
externalities generated by proximity to neighbors.  As discussed earlier, the market equilibrium 
will force households to locate at distances that are either less than or equal to their 
unconstrained optimal distance,  j d
K
.  If  j
*
j d ˆ d < , then increases in income will increase the 
optimal distance, but the magnitude of this effect will depend on the household’s preferences over 
distance.
11  Gregarious households’ demand for distance is highly elastic to income, but at the 
same time they only consider a small range of plausible locations.  Thus, increases in income will 
generate relatively little increase in the amount of scattered development among these 
households.  On the other hand, the demand for distance among loner households is the most 
inelastic to income changes.  In addition, because they choose a location that is relatively far 
away (but not beyond the point at which the externalities vanish), they also have a small range of 
plausible distances from which they are willing to choose.  In contrast, the average households’ 
demand for distance is moderately elastic and these households have the greatest range of 
distances over which they are willing to choose.  Consequently, changes in income are likely to 
affect these households the most in terms of the magnitude of their increase in optimal distance 
and thus, the rate at which scattered development increases as a result of rising incomes.  This 
leads us to conclude that, while the absolute amount of scattered development obviously 
increases in the proportion of loner households in the region that have strong preferences for 
more isolated locations, the rate at which scattered development increases as the result of rising 
incomes will be driven by the proportion of average households in the region.  Holding population 
constant, the rate at which scattered development increases due to rising incomes will be greater 
the higher the proportion of average households in the region.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
We develop a theoretical model to explain scattered development at the urban fringe, as 
characterized by dispersed development with intervening vacant land. The central feature of the 
model is a set of spatial externalities that arise from the relative proximity of neighboring 
                                                
11 It will also depend on the nature of the economies of scale that determine the developers’ offer curves, 
but we abstract from this consideration here.  19
residential development and that influence households’ location decisions.  Both positive and 
negative externalities are hypothesized to exist that generate benefits (agglomerative effects) and 
costs (repelling effects) respectively, which influence a household’s decision regarding its optimal 
average distance from nearest neighbors.  The cumulative result of households’ location choices 
determines the extent of scattered development or sprawl in the region.   
 
Based on a utility-maximizing framework in which households choose distance and a composite 
good, we derive the household’s bid rent function and their demand for distance, which describes 
the households’ implicit price of distance as a function of distance.  We use the basic model to 
examine the impact of economic growth on the scattered development that results from the 
externalities.  Our two main findings are that (1) rising household income generates only 
temporary increases in scattered development due to spatial externalities, holding population 
constant and (2) the rate  at which scattered development increases due to rising incomes will be 
greater the higher the proportion of average households in the region.  The first result is driven by 
the fact that distance behaves as a normal good only up to a certain distance threshold, the 
household’s unconstrained optimal distance,  j d ˆ .  Beyond this point, distance is an inferior good 
and thus further increases in income once the household has reached  j d ˆ  will not be reflected in 
greater distances, ceteris paribus.  The second result is due to the fact that, given our 
assumptions about the heterogeneous preferences of households over distance, households with 
moderated preferences over the positive and negative externalities that are generated by 
distance (i.e., average households), are the most responsive to income changes in terms of 
having both a moderately elastic income elasticity of demand and a relatively large range of 
distances over which their utility is increasing.  Thus, while the absolute amount of scattered 
development will depend on the proportion of households that have strong preferences for more 
isolated locations (loner households), the rate at which scattered development increases as the 
result of rising incomes is driven by the proportion of average households in the region.   
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These results are subject to several important caveats.  First, this model ignores the household’s 
choice over the amount of housing or land that is consumed and thus we do not account for the 
standard income effect associated with housing and land consumption.  Assuming that housing 
and land are both normal goods, this effect would generate an ever-increasing amount of 
scattered development, which is in contrast to the income effect associated with distance that we 
analyze here.  Because the consumption of both the quantity of housing (or land) and its location 
(in terms of distance) are likely to drive observed household behavior, the net effect of these two 
income effects is an empirical question.  Second, we assume that population and preferences 
over spatial externalities are constant.  Clearly the amount of scattered development will increase 
with population as additional households locate in a region.  If the population is homogeneous in 
their preferences, then additional population will simply increase in the geographical extent of the 
developed area in the region.  However, if new households entering the region have different 
preferences—namely, stronger preferences for proximity to neighbors—or if the preferences of 
the existing population change such that there is a larger proportion of more gregarious 
households, then this “temporary” process of increasing sprawl could easily become permanent.   
For example, as new households with stronger preferences for proximity fill up intervening vacant 
land, then these locations will become sub-optimal for existing residents with stronger 
preferences for more distant locations.  In a dynamic setting, such households would choose to 
relocate to more distant locations, thus expanding the geographical extent of sprawl in the region.  
So, with increases in population or even with a constant population, but heterogeneous and 
changing preferences, a stationary state may never be reached.    
 
Despite these limitations, our results are of interest in terms of highlighting the role of spatial 
externalities in generating scattered development and have implications for the efficiency of 
development patterns.  Contrary to the traditional models of leapfrogging, a model in which 
scattered development is driven by spatial externalities implies that the competitive outcome is 
unlikely to be efficient.  In our case, household are both the victims and generators of externalities 
as their location decisions are driven by externalities that are generated by others, but these  21
decisions also generate externalities that impact others’ utility and cause a divergence between 
the private and social optima.  This is akin to Turner’s result that the competitive outcome is 
characterized by not enough intervening open space since individual agents do not take into 
account the impact on others’ utilities of the loss of open space that is generated by their action.  
Here we hypothesize that household interactions lead to both positive and negative externalities 
and thus, depending on the net effects, the competitive outcome will be characterized either by 
houses that are too close (if the net externality is negative) or not close enough (if the net 
externality is positive).   Thus, unlike Turner’s results in which the competitive process always 
leads to overdevelopment of a given area, the competitive outcome in our model may lead to 
either too much or too little development for a given area, depending on the net effect.   
 
Our results have potential implications for the evolution of scattered residential development and 
policies that seek to manage this form of sprawl.  To the extent that spatial externalities drive 
household location, policies that seek to make this form of development more efficient are 
warranted.  However, because both positive and negative externalities may exist, it is unclear 
what the desired policy goal should be.  If there are net positive externalities generated by 
household interactions, then policies that seek to encourage more spatially clustered 
development are warranted.  On the other hand, if negative externalities are stronger, then this 
would suggest that policies should seek to spread development out further and to retain larger 
areas of intervening open space.  Thus, to draw more substantial policy implications from such a 
model, a better understanding is needed of the types of externalities that are generated from 
household proximity, their magnitudes and spatial extents, and the underlying processes that 
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Figures 1-4: Comparison of household types as distinguished by 
heterogeneous preferences over proximity to neighbors 
 
Figure 1. Utility   Figure 2. Compensated Bid Curve  
Figure 3. Willingness to Pay for Distance   Figure 4. Income-elasticity  
 